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Abstract: 
After explaining the “private language argument” (PLA) centered in para. 258 of the 
Philosophical Investigations, the paper first clarifies Wittgenstein’s notion of criteria. The paper then 
discusses the irony in Wittgenstein’s apparent objection to putative private languages that they have 
no criteria for the private use of words. It is then argued that PLA, viewed from a logical perspective, 
is fallacious. The paper then shows how there could be scientific standards (not criteria in 
Wittgenstein’s technical sense) for the existence of private mental states and argues that Wittgenstein 
did not argue that this is impossible. The paper then argues that the conclusion of PLA is a tautology. 
The paper then argues that since the conclusion of PLA is a tautology, Wittgenstein would be 
correctly unmoved by any of the aforementioned objections to PLA. Finally, the paper refutes the 
objection that there is an inconsistency in the present interpretation and shows how resolving this 
objection shows that Wittgenstein’s PLA is to be understood in the context of his longstanding 
interest in setting the limits of language.  
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Now, what about the language which describes my 
 inner experiences and which only I myself can understand? 
        Philosophical Investigations (256)1 
 
A “private language” can only be understood by the person who uses it (Kenny 1973, 179; 
McGinn 1984, 48). One asserts that there is a private language in cases where a person is claimed to 
have direct access, denied to others, to their own mental states (Ayer 1968, 253-54, 258). Descartes 
(1969 I, 9) appears to be committed to a private language. Dejnozka (1995) sees anticipations of it 
in Lock and Frege. Fodor (1979) holds that we must acknowledge a private language of thought. 
However, Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (hereafter PI), the seminal work in his “later 
philosophy,”2   argues that private languages are impossible. Call this Wittgenstein’s “Private 
Language Argument” or PLA! The paper argues that PLA is fallacious but that its conclusion is a 
tautology.  
§ I gives a sketch of PLA. § II discusses PLA’s notion of “criteria”. § III discusses an irony in 
PLA’s objection to private languages. § IV argues that PLA, viewed logically, is fallacious. § V argues 
that there can be objective evidence for the existence of private objects. § VI argues that the 
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conclusion of PLA is tautologous. § VII explains why Wittgenstein would, correctly, be unmoved 
by the aforementioned objections. § VIII argues that PLA is properly understood in the light of 
Wittgenstein’s longstanding view that there are limits to language.  
 
I. A Summary of Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument 
Wittgenstein’s fundamental point is that … in a putative private language … there is … 
   no check on whether the words which only I (the speaker) understand are being employed 
   with a constant meaning …. because [I] only [have] an impression of constancy to go on, 
   which does not entail that any rule is being consistently followed, … 
        McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning (48) 
 
One would not normally claim that an ordinary person N’s colour-language is a private 
language because ordinary people live in a community of people who talk about colours. If members 
of N’s linguistic community observe N describe green objects as red, they can correct N. One 
normally asserts a private language only in those cases in which a person is alleged to enjoy a direct 
acquaintance with their own mental states and unavailable to others. That is, whereas N is directly 
aware of her own toothache, her friend, M, can only know of her toothache indirectly, if at all. 
Similarly, M is directly acquainted with his own toothache and to which N can only have indirect 
access. On this view, people share a common world of public objects, like trees, about which they 
discourse relatively unproblematically, but each harbors a private world mental states with which 
each alone is directly acquainted. Thus, only N really knows what she means by “toothache”. 
Further, since no one other than oneself can be directly aware of one’s mental states, each person is 
the ultimate authority on the facts about their own mental states. As Wittgenstein puts it: “Even if 
no one knows what I call ‘toothache’, at least I know” (LSD, 295; See Z, 536). Thus, if N wishes to 
set up a private language to record the history of her toothaches, she is in the perfect authoritative 
position to do so. 
Wittgenstein argues that this is an illusion. The core of PLA is stated in PI (para. 258), 
 
I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the 
sign “S” and write a sign in a calendar for every day [when] I have the sensation. … [A] definition of 
the sign cannot be formulated. But … I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition. … I speak or 
write the sign down, and … concentrate my attention on the sensation—and so, as it were, point to 
it inwardly. But what is this ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to 
establish the meaning of the sign. Well, this is done by [concentrating] my attention; for in this way 
I impress upon myself the connection between the sign and the sensation. But “I impress it on 
myself” can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection right in the 
future. But in the present case, I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is 
going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about “right”.  
 
Wittgenstein has sensation S, which he calls “S”, and determines to record in his diary every 
later date on which he has this sensation. In order to ensure that he uses this private language 
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correctly, he concentrates on S to make sure that he remembers the connection between his sensation 
and sign “S”. If S reappears the next day, he will write “S” in his diary on that date.3 
PI (258) disparages this procedure for setting up the private language as a “ceremony”. His 
objection is that this method for establishing the connection between the sensation and the sign does 
not establish any criterion for the correct use of the sign. For, if he later misremembers the sign-
sensation correlation, he has no way of determining that his memory is incorrect. This problem does 
not arise for a public language. Suppose Wittgenstein sees a green patch, which he calls “G”, and 
decides to write down in his diary every time he subsequently sees that same colour. He later sees a 
red patch and records “G” in his diary. His friend, observing the mistake, can correct him. The 
possibility of this kind of independent check is what is lacking for a private sensation-language. That 
is why Wittgenstein concludes that in a putative private language, “whatever is going to seem right 
to me is right”, which means that “we can’t talk about ‘right’”: “The balance on which impressions 
are to be weighed is not the impression of a balance” (PI, 259). Since a genuine language requires 
standards for the right use of words, and since a private language does not permit such standards, a 
“private language” is not a genuine language.  
 
II. Wittgenstein’s Notion of Criteria 
Philosophers have notoriously found it difficult in making  
sense of Wittgenstein’s remarks about criteria. 
      Baker and Hacker, Scepticism, Rules and Language (111) 
 
Given the importance of the notion of a criterion to PLA, it is surprising that Wittgenstein 
takes such little care in defining it. Albritton’s account of criteria is discussed in the present section. 
Cavell’s alternative account is discussed in the replies to objections in § VII. Albritton (1968, 232-
33) remarks that the only place in Wittgenstein’s published work in which he “gives anything like a 
definition” is in the Blue Book, which he did not, apparently, hold in high esteem and which he 
intended primarily as a set of notes for his Cambridge students (Rhees 1965, vii). The Blue Book, 
together with the Brown Book, which latter Wittgenstein preferred, were later published together as 
The Blue and Brown Books (hereafter, BB) (Rhees 1965, vii). The definition of a criterion in the Blue 
Book boils down to the view that the criterion of X’s being F is “a logically sufficient condition” of 
X’s being F (Albritton 1968, 234). However, there are places in the Brown Book which suggest that 
the criterion of X’s being F must be a logically necessary and sufficient condition of X’s being F (BB, 
121-122; Albritton 1968, 235). 
One can further clarify this notion by reference to BB’s distinction between criteria and 
symptoms. If science defines angina as an inflammation of the throat caused by bacteria Y, then an 
inflamed throat is merely a symptom of angina, but the criterion of someone’s having angina is the 
presence of Y in the blood (BB, 24-25). That someone with an inflamed throat has angina is only a 
“hypothesis”, but that someone with Y in the blood has angina is a “tautology” (BB, 25). BB does 
not mean that it is a tautology like those of formal logic, but in the ordinary sense in which something 
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is a tautology if it “says the same thing twice over”. The connection between the phenomenon and 
the criterion is “logical” while that between the phenomenon and its symptoms is contingently 
discovered by experience.  
Albritton (1968, 236) stresses that by characterizing BB’s notion of a “criterion” for X’s being 
F as the notion of “a logically necessary and sufficient condition” for X’s being F, BB does not mean 
that the “defining criterion” correspond to a real essence. Rather, BB’s (114) criteria are rooted in the 
fact that people “accept”, “adopt” or “apply” certain “conventions” in their uses of words 
(Albritton, 1968, 236). It is crucial that these criteria are public. The Blue Book (1-2) begins with the 
discussion how “we” use words and how words are used in “our” language. The Brown Book (77) 
begins with the contrast between the way the word “brick” is used in one of Wittgenstein’s “language 
games” and the way it is used “in our language [LW’s italics]”. The emphasis on how “I” view the 
world in Wittgenstein’s earlier TLP (5.631), is replaced in BB by an emphasis on how “we” use words 
in “our” public language. That is, BB understands “philosophical grammar” as the “grammar” of a 
public language.  
Finally, BB (9, 61-62, 69, 87, 91, 107-115, 134, 137, 171) stresses that what counts as the 
criteria for X’s being F does so only in certain “contexts” or “circumstances.” Wittgenstein’s BB and 
his subsequent works are much more sensitive to the context-dependency of human language than 
TLP had been. To take one obvious example, X’s holding their jaw and writhing on the couch may 
be a criterion of X’s having a toothache in normal circumstances, but not if the event takes place in 
a play or as part of a prank. For BB, the criterion of X’s being F does not consist in some timeless 
essence fixed once and for all. Rather, one can only ask about the criterion of X’s being F in certain 
circumstances.  
Although Albritton’s (1968, 243) remark that most of the ways Wittgenstein talks about 
criteria in BB are “almost entirely suppressed” in Wittgenstein’s subsequent works is an 
overstatement, there is some truth to it. Albritton goes in the same passage to explain that the 
“dominant conception” in Wittgenstein’s post-BB works is that a criterion for somethings being X 
is that it is “something by which” in certain circumstances “one may be justified in saying that the 
thing” is X “and by whose absence” in those circumstances “one may be justified in saying that the 
thing is not” X. However, BB’s talk of sufficient or necessary and sufficient conditions is absent from 
PI and replaced by the idea that the criterion of X’s having a toothache might, in certain 
circumstances, simply be a kind of behaviour, like holding one’s jaw and writhing on the couch. 
Although BB recognized the importance of the circumstances in which criteria are applied, 
Wittgenstein’s PI recognizes that a full appreciation of the context-dependency of criteria destroys the 
idea that criteria for something’s being X might consist in necessary and/or sufficient conditions. 
However, PI retains the idea that a criterial connection is “logical” because PI still makes a distinction 
between criteria and symptoms (Albritton 1968, 244). The logically necessary and sufficient 
conditions for X’s being F in BB is replaced in PI by the notion of someone’s being justified, on 
broadly logical grounds, to say that X is F, where the “semantic ascent” (Quine 2013, 249ff) from 
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the idea of criteria for X’s being F to the idea of criteria that justify one in certain circumstances to 
say that X is F, is crucial to PI’s new formulation.  
It is because Wittgenstein’s notion of criteria is constantly evolving that he only comes close 
to defining it in a work that he disparages in a letter to Russell. Since one must glean its relevant 
meaning in PI from a handful of examples, Kripke (1982, 99) wisely declines to attempt to settle 
“the finer exegetical points in Wittgenstein’s notion of a criterion,” but only to sketch the key points 
of that notion that are relevant to his own project. The same strategy is followed here. For what 
remains constant from the beginning is that these broadly logical criteria are part of a public language 
that must be applied in the correct circumstances. 
 
III. What Need for a Criterion?  
What is the criterion for the redness of an image? For me, when it is someone’s else’s 
image: what he says and does. For myself, when it is my image: nothing. 
           Philosophical Investigations (377) 
 
Wittgenstein’s demand in PLA for a criterion concerning the correct use of his private 
sensation words is ironic since he regularly chastises philosophers for demanding reasons in many 
cases. Since he states in the first paragraph of PI that “Explanations come to an end somewhere,” this 
general recurrent idea must be of some importance to him. (See also Z, 313-315) An analogous 
theme appears in his philosophy of mathematics (RFM, II, 78). But if one can get by without 
explanations in such very different cases, why should one need a criterion for how one uses words in 
a private language? One might reply that an explanation for how one uses words is not the same 
thing as a criterion for how one uses words—and that is true. However, multiple variations on this 
theme are pervasive throughout his “later philosophy”. At PI (211), referring to our reasons for 
continuing certain patterns as we do, he writes, “Well, how do I know [how to continue the 
pattern]?—If that means “Have I reasons?” the answer is: my reasons will soon give out. And then I 
will act without reasons.” At PI (217), referring to the question how we obey rules, he writes: “If I 
have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined 
to say: ‘This is simply what I do’.” At OC (78, 253, 612) he states that our practice of giving reasons 
must come to an end. At OC (148), in response to a question how he is certain that he can get up 
from a chair, he answers: “There is no why. This is how I act”. At OC (164), in response to a question 
whether one needs to do tests to determine whether objects continue to exist when unobserved, he 
replies that testing must come to an end somewhere. At OC (624-25), in response to a question 
whether one can be certain that this colour is called “green” in English, he replies that our rules come 
to an end somewhere and adds that “A doubt that did not come to an end would not be a doubt”.  
Thus, when Wittgenstein demands a criterion for how one uses one’s private words, why 
should one not reply that criteria come to an end somewhere? If Wittgenstein replies that surely one 
needs a reason for applying private words as one does, why should one not reply that reasons come 
to an end somewhere? If Wittgenstein is asked how one can be certain that one has identified 
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sensation S properly, why should one not reply: “There is no why. This is how I act”? When 
Wittgenstein points out that one can raise doubts about how one applies one’s private words, why 
should one not reply that “A doubt that did not come to an end would not be a doubt”? 
Wittgenstein admits this himself. When asked what his criterion is for deciding whether his own 
image is red, his answer is “nothing” (see epigraph above). But then why does one require a criterion 
for how one uses one’s private words? Thus, Ayer (1968, 260) points out that on Wittgenstein’s own 
principles, “Verification must stop somewhere”. Call this the objection to PLA from the fact that 
the need for Criteria must come to an End Somewhere or CES!  
 
IV. The Fallacy in the “Private Language Argument”  
   I should like you to say [Ich mӧchte doch, daß du sagst]: “Yes, it’s true, you can imagine 
   that too, that might happen too”—I wanted to put that picture before him, and his 
   acceptance of that picture consists in his now being inclined to regard that case differently: 
   that is, to compare it with this rather than that set of pictures. I have changed his way of 
   looking at things. (Indian mathematicians: “Look at this!” [all emphasis, LW’s]) 
        Philosophical Investigations (144) 
 
The last two crucial lines of PLA, that 1.) “whatever is going to seem right to me is right”, and 
that, 2.) “we can’t talk about right’,” are misleading in several ways. Consider the first of these claims. 
For, in fact, PI (258) does not assert that “whatever is going to seem right to me is right”. The complete 
line is: “One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right”. However, there are 
many things the present author “would like to say” but cannot say because they are not true. The 
present author “would like to say” that mass shootings in the US will soon become a thing of the 
past, but that does not mean that this will become true. Further, Wittgenstein’s remark that he 
“would like to say …” something is not a casual formulation but is connected with his unusual way 
of arguing. Referring to one of his arguments about what it means to say something about the 
learning process (see epigraph above), he explains his way of arguing, namely that he puts a new 
“picture” before one in order to get one to look at the case in a new way. Thus, PI (258) does not 
present a logical argument that in a private language “whatever is going to seem right to me is right”. 
It presents the reader with a new picture of language in order to break the grip of the old more 
rationalist picture that sees more cognitive structure underlying language. If Wittgenstein can 
persuade people to accept his new picture, they will then “like to say”, with him, of a putative private 
language that “whatever is going to seem right to me is right.” That is, PLA does not aim to prove 
anything, but to persuade people, by employing certain imaginative techniques, to see language 
differently.  
This is connected to the second oddity in PLA. The entire argument at PI (258) is conducted 
from the first-person point of view (“I want to keep a diary … To this end I associate …”)—until the 
last sentence where the “I” unaccountably changes to “We”: “And that only means that here we 
[can’t …”. But how can Wittgenstein possibly infer from the fact that I, LW, from my private mental 
prison, cannot talk about “right,” to the conclusion that we beings in the real world cannot talk about 
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right? For, if the entire argument is conducted from his first-person point of view, he is only entitled 
to infer that “I [LW]” can’t talk about ‘right’”—and what does that have to do with the much more 
robust conceptual resources of a public linguistic community? Further, since, as argued above, PI 
(258) never asserts that “whatever is going to seem right to me is right”, but only that he “would like 
to say” this, and since one cannot make inferences from a sentence that is not asserted in the 
argument, the final conclusion of the argument (that we cannot talk about right), is not arrived at 
by inference. Thus, if PLA is judged logically, it is fallacious. Call this the objection from the fact that 
PLA is Fallacious or PLAF!  
Although it sounds paradoxical, Wittgenstein’s “Private Language Argument” is not an 
argument (not an attempt to infer conclusions from premises by means of logical principles). 
Wittgenstein never describes it as an argument, and numerous commentators have questioned 
whether it can be called an argument proper (Candlish 2014, §1; Biletzki and Matar 2018, § 3.5). 
This should be no surprise. Wittgenstein holds that “Philosophy simply puts everything before us 
and neither explains nor deduces anything” (PI, 125). PLA is not a deduction. But if PLA is not a 
logical argument, what is it? At PI (109) Wittgenstein states that “we must do away with all 
explanation and description alone must take its place”. Thus, the proper inference is that PLA is an 
imaginative description to persuade “we” beings who live in a public world to look at the perennial 
philosophical idea of a private language in a different way: “Indian mathematicians: “Look at this!” 
(PI, 144). “To repeat: don’t think, but look!” (PI, 66).  
 
V. Scientific Standards for the Existence of Private Objects 
    Using psychophysical ratings to define pain sensitivity and functional magnetic  
   resonance imaging [fMRI] to assess brain activity, we found that highly sensitive  
   individuals exhibited more frequent and more robust pain-induced activation of the  
   primary somatosensory cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and prefrontal cortex than 
 did insensitive individuals.  
      Coghill et al, “Neural Correlates of Interindividual Differences  
       in the Subjective Experience of Pain” (8538) 
  
The conclusion of PLA is ambiguous. One must distinguish between 1.) the criteria for the 
use of words that the speakers of those private languages themselves understand, and 2.) objective 
standards (not criteria) for the presence of private states from a 3rd person point of view. Kripke 
(1982, 109) attributes the first of these to Wittgenstein when he defines a private language as one 
that it is “impossible for anyone else to understand.” That is, he rejects the view that some third party 
could possess “criteria” for the correct uses of N’s private words without themselves understanding 
N’s private criteria. By contrast, a third-party account lend itself to scientific standards for the 
correctness of N’s private uses of words - and one only requires a third-party standard (not criteria) 
to be able to “talk about ‘right’” in N’s use of private words. That is, a neuroscientist does not 
themselves have to understand N’s private “criteria” when they attribute a certain sensory state to 
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N. The present section argues that nothing in PLA precludes that there could be objective scientific 
standards for the right uses of private words.  
Consider the following example! Wittgenstein writes down the penultimate conclusion of PI 
(258) when he is interrupted by two Cambridge scientists who inform him that he is mistaken when 
he infers that we cannot take about “right” here. They tell him that they have been monitoring his 
brain, behaviour and physical environment over the past months with state-of-the-art equipment. 
The findings are that when he set out to write down the name “S” every time he has sensation S, he 
was staring at a specific kind of green plant and they have a detailed description of all of his 
neurophysiological and sensory states over that period. There are, they inform him, 34 different 
shades of green in his environment, but the only thing that exhibits that particular shade of green 
(call it green29) is that plant. Furthermore, they have verified that on all of the occasions in which he 
wrote down “S” in diary he was looking at that same green29 plant in good lighting. In addition, and 
perhaps most surprising, on 9 occasions over that period, he was observed staring at a different green 
plant and began to write down “S” in his diary but hesitated and deleted the entry. This is very 
interesting, they point out, because that colour of that plant, green28, is very similar to that of the 
green29 plant. However, since the two shades, though close, are visually distinguishable, they are 
impressed that though he began to record an “S” in his diary, he ended up deleting it in each case, 
which shows that he can see the difference between these colours. Thus, they are happy to inform 
him that each time he wrote down “S” in his diary, their scientific data confirms that he was in fact 
having exactly the same sensation S. Despite his “human, all too human”4 doubts that his memory 
might have deceived him about his diary entries, their data shows that he correctly applied “S” to the 
same sensation S over the whole period and never wrote down “S” for a non-green29 object. “You 
may be right,” they tell him, “that you don’t have any standards for talking about ‘right’ here, but we 
scientists do have them”5 
Finally, these scientists add that they do not pretend to “understand” Wittgenstein’s private 
sensation words the way he does inside his private mental prison. What we can say, they tell him, is 
that your (LW’s) neurophysiological and sensory states and relations to the environment display 
such impressive regularities that we can say with confidence that each time you wrote an “S” in your 
diary you were in the very same neurophysiological and sensory state that you were in when you first 
named sensation “S”. It is just a happy contingent fact that whether you have a private “criterion” or 
not, your memory is such cases is very good—which is not surprising since a reliable memory of one’s 
sensations would enhance survivability and therefore be selected to by evolution. Indeed, 
Wittgenstein appears to acknowledges the possibility of such correlations between private sensations 
and physical states himself when he admits that one might discover a “useful” correlation between 
one’s private sensation and a rise in one’s blood pressure PI (270).  
One cannot, therefore, deny that there could be substantial objective scientific evidence that 
Wittgenstein is correctly re-identifying the sensation S when his memory tells him that that he is 
having that sensation. In fact, although there is much more work to do, neurophysiologists have 
Richard McDonough - Wittgenstein’s “Private Language Argument” and the Limits of Language 
28 
documented an impressive set of similar regularities (see epigraph above).6 However, the present 
argument does not presuppose that these correlations have been definitively scientifically established. 
It requires only that it is possible to establish such correlations. For if PI (258) were to provide a 
convincing argument that privately correctly reidentifying one’s sensations is impossible, it would 
have to rule out that such scientific evidence is even possible. But nothing in the PI (258) even 
addresses the question of possible scientific standards and PI (270) appears to admit that such 
correlations are possible. Call this the objection from the existence of an Objective Scientific Model 
of private criteria or OSM!  
It will be replied that the standard view that the moral of PI (270), taken in its entirety, is the 
opposite of the one drawn here, e.g., Garver (1994, 214-15) points out that this “perplexing” passage 
seems to take back everything Wittgenstein has been arguing, but that, taken as a whole, it denies 
that the passage changes everything. For, Garver points out, the last lines in PI (270) reaffirms the 
standard interpretation that the “private sensation” drops out as irrelevant. Thus, what this “useful” 
correlation really amounts to is only a correlation between writing “S” in one’s diary and a rise in 
one’s blood pressure (both public events). 
Garver makes a good point, but it does not undermine the present argument. First, the present 
argument is not based on an exegesis of PI (270). It is rather that when the scientific facts are taken 
into account, what PI (270) gives with the one hand cannot completely be taken away by the other. 
For OSM can be run entirely without an appeal to Wittgenstein’s “admission” in PI (270). PI (270) 
is useful here because it provides a textual opening to raise OSM. Further, it is argued later (§ VIII) 
that when the whole series PI (270-272) is taken into account, it becomes clear that Wittgenstein 
does make an important admission at PI (270) that is often unappreciated.  
Consider Garver’s interpretation from the perspective of OSM! When Garver says that 
Wittgenstein’s ultimate point in PI (270) is that the alleged private sensations drop out as irrelevant 
to that “useful” correlation, the aforementioned Cambridge scientists will point out that when 
Wittgenstein said on 13 occasions that he experienced sensation S and wrote “S” in his diary, the 
scientific evidence shows that he was in a relevantly similar neurophysiological and sensory states. 
Since Wittgenstein reports his sensations as a result of his experiences, not by looking at scientific 
data, it would be impossible to deny that Wittgenstein was sensing the same thing in all the cases 
when he wrote “S” in his diary. It is, however, crucial to recall that these scientists are not claiming to 
have discovered scientific criteria (in Wittgenstein’s sense of the word) for the presence of private 
sensations, but, rather, scientific evidence for the presence of private states that correlate with 
Wittgenstein’s overt behaviour. PI (258)’s conclusion that “we can’t talk about ‘right’ here” at all is 
simply too strong. 
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VI. The Tautologous Conclusion of the “Private Language Argument”  
   The problems are solved, not by giving new information,  
but by arranging what we have already known.  
        Philosophical Investigations (109) 
 
Although PLA is often understood as an argument for the claim that a “Private Language” is 
impossible, the conclusion of PLA is actually a tautology in the ordinary sense that it just repeats the 
same thing over again. If Wittgenstein’s views are “grammatical propositions” (PI, 251, 295, 458), 
then they are true by virtue of grammatical “conventions” (PI, 355). Thus, the conclusion of PLA 
gives no information but merely rehearses the grammatical conventions of our language.  
In fact, Wittgenstein presupposes in BB and PI that he is concerned only with the sense in which 
words in a public language have meaning. BB (1) begins with the remark that asking how “‘we 
[emphasis added] measure length?’ helps us to understand the problem ‘What is length?’”. In PI (1) 
he describes an interaction between a customer and shopkeeper in the purchase of 5 apples, the point 
being that what is relevant to the meaning of the words is only what goes on in their public 
interaction, not what goes on in the shopkeeper’s mind. This theme continues at PI (6) where the 
“purpose” of the word in the block-pillar-slab language is not to produce an image in someone’s 
mind but to get other members of the “tribe” to perform certain actions. 
It is evident throughout his “later philosophy” that what interests Wittgenstein is “our 
[public] language” (PI, 51, 497, 230; Z, 532, 545). He makes this explicit at PI (261),  
 
What reason have we for calling “S” the sign for a sensation? For “sensation” is a word in our common 
language, not one intelligible to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification 
which everybody understands [emphasis added].  
 
Since the criteria for the use of words are “necessarily” public (Khatchadourian 2007, 57), the 
conclusion of PLA only means that words in a language that only employs criteria for the private 
purposes of the language-user cannot have a public purpose—but that is a tautology. One can put 
this another way: Since Wittgenstein makes clear in PI that he is interested in language as a system of 
communication (See PI, 3, 491), the conclusion of PLA is that private words useful only for oneself 
are not useful for communication with others—but that too is a tautology. Thus, a private language 
would be of no use whatsoever for the participants in the shopkeeper-customer or block-pillar-slab 
or “language-games” at PI (1-2).  
This result provides a different perspective on Kripke’s (1982, 109) view that in a private 
language it is “logically impossible” for anyone other than the user of that private language to 
understand. Kripke’s definition is correct, but easily misconceived. If, for example, one thinks this 
logical impossibility derives from a mysterious “condition or process of consciousness” (McGinn 
1984, 80), i.e., from something metaphysical, it is misconceived. The reason it is logically impossible 
for anyone other than N to understand the meanings of N’s private words is very similar to the reason 
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why it is impossible for there to be “a rod without a length” (PI, 251). For both of these “claims” run 
afoul of our grammatical conventions. 
 
VII. No Thesis, No Debate  
   If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them,  
   because everyone would agree to them.  
        Philosophical Investigations (128) 
 
If as argued in § IV, PLA is logically fallacious, and if, therefore, PLA is merely an attempt at 
persuasion, is this not an admission that it is sophistry? The answer is that if the conclusion of PLA 
were a substantial thesis, the answer would be “yes”, but that since the conclusion of PLA is really a 
tautology, the proper response is not a philosophical argument for a substantial conclusion, but a 
“reminder” about the grammar of the relevant words (PI, 127). People do not generally need such 
reminders until they have “become calloused by doing philosophy” (PI, 348; Malcolm 1986, 160). 
For no one who has not done philosophy would ever think of saying that they cannot know that 
their child, who is writhing on the floor from a bad burn, is in pain. A philosopher will entertain 
such fantastic “theses” in their study, but, like Hume (1967, 264, 269) when they return to their 
daily life, these alleged “theses” will appear “cold” and “ridiculous”.  
Since the conclusion of PLA is a tautology, not a thesis (see epigraph above), it does not need 
to be proved any more than that the statement “Every rod has a length” needs to be proved. There is 
therefore no possibility of debating such matters because everyone would agree on them, just as there 
is no possibility of debating analytical sentences—assuming that people understand the words 
involved. Thus, for Wittgenstein, a philosophical discussion is not a “debate” about what is true, but 
an attempt to “clarify” what is being said (PI, 125, 133, CV, 19). This is why Wittgenstein would be 
unconcerned with the previous objections to PLA in §’s III, IV and V respectively.  
Consider first CES, the objection that since Wittgenstein himself regularly stresses that 
explanations and reasons must end somewhere, he is inconsistent when he refuses to accept the 
private language user’s claim that their memory is a sufficient criterion for the correct uses of their 
private words! However, if the conclusion of PLA is really the tautology that a language that only 
employs words for the private purposes of the language user cannot employ those words for a public 
purpose, Wittgenstein can admit that the private language user’s criteria can also come to an end 
somewhere but insist that it is a tautology that in a language proper these criteria must come to an 
end in public ways of behaving. The problem with private criteria is not that they come to an end 
somewhere but that they are private. There is no inconsistency.  
Consider second the objection from the fact that the Private Language Argument is Fallacious 
or PLAF. However, since the conclusion of PLA is a tautology, it does not require the sort of proof 
it would require if it were a substantive conclusion. Since, in this sort of case, one only needs 
“reminded” of the tautological character of the conclusion, it does not matter if it is logically 
fallacious. In this kind of case, what is important is only that the “argument” is persuasive. And, in 
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fact, PLA is precisely, as Wittgenstein states at PI (109), a “description” of linguistic behaviour 
designed to persuade us that the alleged “meanings” of private worlds are not comparable to the 
meanings of words in a genuine public language.  
Consider now the third objection based on the existence of an Objective Scientific Model of 
private criteria or OSM! Once again, Wittgenstein would reply that when he talks about criteria, he 
means the sorts of criteria that are found in the grammatical conventions of a language, not the 
evidence that might emerge from a scientific laboratory. Wittgenstein’s remark that “it’s in language 
that it’s all done” (PG, VII, 9; OC, 3), cannot be overemphasized. For what scientists can discover in 
their laboratories are correlations between items in the world, e.g., a brain state and a rise in blood 
pressure, not grammatical conventions within the language. Since the scientific standards that 
determine that there is a right and wrong about Wittgenstein’s private states resemble what 
Wittgenstein calls “symptoms” of his sensory states learned from experience rather than grammatical 
conventions, scientists might discover evidence that someone has reidentified a certain private 
sensation correctly, but it is a tautology that the scientist cannot discover the kind of grammatical 
“criteria” (in Wittgenstein’s and Kripke’s technical sense) that determine the meaning of a word in a 
public language. 
The final objection is that the present interpretation relies too heavily on Albritton’s account 
of criteria and ignores other accounts, like Cavell’s (1999) alternative account. Whereas Albritton 
and other early scholars interpreted Wittgenstein’s notion of a criterion against the background of 
the skeptical challenge whether one can know that a certain private object exists, Cavell (1999, 16), 
emphasizing PI (373), holds that the criterion for the use of a word determines “what kind of object 
anything is”, which, in turn, determines how the words that describe that sort of object are properly 
used. In fact, Cavell’s account facilitates the argument of the present paper. For, on Cavell’s 
interpretation, the criteria for the words “pain” and “coin” determine “what kind of ‘objects” pains 
and coins are, which is to give the “grammar” of those words. But if the criteria give the grammar of 
such words, Wittgenstein’s point in PLA is that the grammar of the words “language” and 
“meaning” require that a genuine linguistic meaning must be publicly communicable. But that is 
precisely what is meant in the present paper by the claim that the conclusion of PLA us a tautology. 
 
VIII. Private Objects and the Limits of Language  
   The essential thing about private experience [privaten Erelebnis] is really not that each  
   person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people have this  
   [LW’s emphasis] or something else. 
        Philosophical Investigations (272) 
 
One might argue that there is a glaring contradiction in the present paper. How can the paper 
consistently claim in § V that there can be objective scientific evidence that Wittgenstein correctly 
correlates his words with private sensations and yet claim in § VI that the conclusion of PLA, that 
there cannot be a private language, is a tautology? For if the conclusion of PLA is a tautology, there 
cannot be scientific evidence that Wittgenstein has one!  
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There is no contradiction, but one must pay close attention to the specific formulations in § 
V. What is argued there is that there can be objective scientific evidence that Wittgenstein correctly 
reidentifies his private sensation S and this correlates with his diary entries—and that is sufficient to 
establish that “we” scientists can “talk about” a “right” use of words here. That is, although in this 
case there are no “criteria” in Kripke’s and Wittgenstein’s technical sense for the correct use of private 
words, there can be scientific standards that determine whether or not Wittgenstein correctly wrote 
“S” in his diary upon having certain sensations. The tautological conclusion of PLA only requires 
that Wittgenstein’s establishing such correlations does not constitute a language proper! 
To illustrate this, consider a hypothetical case in which, Lara, hiking in the jungle, encounters 
a gorilla and the gorilla becomes frightened. The present author assumes that there is something 
going on in the gorilla’s brain or “mind”, in whatever sense one can talk about a gorilla’s mind, when 
he encounters Lara for the second time, reidentifies her, and attacks her. Note that nothing in this 
description of the gorilla’s reidentification of Lara implies that it has a private language.  
Compare this with Wittgenstein’s reidentifying his sensation S and writing down “S” in its 
diary, where Wittgenstein’s reidentifying his sensation corresponds to the gorilla reidentifying his 
experience of Lara and Wittgenstein’s writing down “S” in his diary corresponds to the gorilla’s 
attacking behavior. Just as the gorilla reidentified Lara on their second meeting and attacked her, 
Wittgenstein reidentifies his sensation S on a later occasion and writes “S” in his diary. Thus, there is 
something “right” about Wittgenstein’s behavior just as there is something “right” about the gorilla’s 
behavior. The gorilla did identify the “right” person in his second experience of her. Presumably a 
neuroscientist, monitoring the ape’s neurophysiological states and environment could verify these 
facts. That is, in both of these cases, one has merely described a biological mechanism, not a 
meaningful grammatical connection. 
The critic might reply, however, that § V claims more, namely that science can provide 
evidence that Wittgenstein correctly reidentifies a private object – and this is the case! In order to 
render this consistent with Wittgenstein’s view that it is a tautology that there cannot be a private 
language, one must, therefore, show that there is a gap between private objects and private languages. 
That seems extreme, but this is precisely what Wittgenstein suggests in PI (272) where he admits 
that, when discussing “privaten Erelebnis,” people “can have their “own exemplar,” but denies that 
there can be a private “this” that nobody else can know about (where the demonstrative “this” is 
crucial to the formulation). But why is ok to say that N has a private sensation but wrong to say that 
no one can know that N has “this” private sensation?  
At PI (380), warning against the tendency to posit a “private ostensive definition,” 
Wittgenstein remarks that it must be possible to ask of any putative “this” “what” it is: “This?—
What?”. Since that is precisely what is impossible for the private “this” referenced in PI (272), 
Wittgenstein can admit “privaten Erelebnis” (“one’s own exemplar”) but deny a private language to 
describe it. This is a difficult position. There is only one way to resolve it, namely, that PLA is a later 
installment on Wittgenstein’s longstanding interest in setting the “limits of language” (TLP, 
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Preface). Against this background, what PLA actually purports to show is that in the attempt to 
construct a private language, a private system of descriptions of these private “thisses”, one “bumps” 
one’s head “against the limits of language” (PI, 119), thereby enabling one better to understand the 
nature of language proper. These “bumps” on one’s head enable one to see that one may have one’s 
“privaten Erelebnis”, but that one cannot put these “privaten Erelebnis” into words. But that does 
not mean that a scientist cannot determine that Wittgenstein is in a private sensory state, so long as 
that scientist is not themselves required to understand what it means for someone to be in “this” 
sensory state (that is, to possess the criteria that would enable them to do so). But why should the 
scientist be expected to understand such criteria when Wittgenstein, who is in that state, cannot 
understand them either. For it is a tautology that there cannot be such criteria. Wittgenstein, despite 
the fact that he possesses his own “privaten Erelebnis,” does not understand anything the scientist 
does not understand. 
     
Endnotes: 
1. Wittgenstein’s works are abbreviated as follows: Tractatus-logico-philosophicus [TLP]; “The Language 
of Sense Data and Private Experience” [LSD], Philosophical Grammar [PG], The Blue and Brown 
Books [BB]; Philosophical Investigations [PI]; Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics [RFM]; 
On Certainty [OC]; Culture and Value [CV], and Zettel [Z]. References to TLP are by proposition 
number, to LSD and CV by page number, to OC and Z by paragraph number, to PI, unless indicated 
otherwise, by paragraph number, to PG and RFM, by section and paragraph number. References to 
works of other philosophers are, unless otherwise indicated, to page number.  
2. Although it is difficult to make a sharp distinction between Wittgenstein’s “early” and “later” 
philosophies, Wittgenstein made this distinction himself (Kripke 1982, 78, 120-123), and this is 
sufficient for present purposes. By Wittgenstein’s “early philosophy” is here meant TLP. By his “later 
philosophy” is here meant the works beginning with BB and PI. The remarks from PG and CV cited 
here are consistent with the later philosophy. 
3. Candlish (2014, § 3.3) distinguishes between remembering the meaning of the sign “S” and being able 
to “apply ‘S’” infallibly “only to S's in the future” and argues that PI (258) only requires the former. 
However, PI (258) states that one wants to keep a diary about the “recurrence [Wiederkehren]” of 
certain sensations. This clearly requires being able to correctly record the recurrence of that sensation 
in the future. 
4. See Nietzsche’s Human, All Too Human! 
5. The textual example abstracts from various kinds of differences that could complicate matters, e.g., 
race, gender, and species differences. The present aim is only to show, employing a simplified 
example, that scientists could in principle provide objective evidence that someone correctly 
reidentifies the same sensation over time. See note # 6! 
6. For a discussion of the positive results that have been achieved in identifying the neural correlates of 
sensations, but also a frank discussion of the problems, see Fonteneau and Davidoff (2006)! See note 
5!     
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